Continental divide : how did the European debt crisis become so severe? by Ross Lawrence
C
oncerns about sovereign debt — essentially, the debt
of national governments — in Europe have spread
briskly. For many in the United States, perhaps the
most disconcerting element of the debt crisis is that fiscal
spending, debt repayment, and currency valuation issues
thousands of miles from home can have real implications for
the American economy. Investors, for instance, recall the
Russian default of the late 1990s and the turmoil that fol-
lowed in financial markets. 
How did fiscal problems in southern Europe become so
severe, raising concerns about the sustainability of the eco-
nomic recovery in the region? And how did the euro, a
currency that some economists and policymakers once spec-
ulated could replace the dollar as the world reserve currency,
lose nearly a quarter of its value against the dollar during the
past two years?
Timeline of the Crisis
In October 2009, the Socialist Pasok Party won the Greek
national elections in a landslide, ousting a center-right gov-
ernment plagued by both a corruption scandal and growing
economic turbulence. With Greece under new leadership,
its government began revising the country’s questionable
budget outlooks. It adjusted the projected deficit to 
12.7 percent of GDP, more than double the deficit projec-
tion submitted to European Union (EU) officials earlier in
the year. In October, Greece drew a rebuke from the
European Commission for failing to meet its deficit targets.
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member
countries are generally expected to maintain annual deficits
totaling no more than 3 percent of GDP, although some lee-
way is often granted — Greece had claimed 3.7 percent to be
its number earlier in 2009, for example. Also in October,
Moody’s Investor Services said it would review the country’s
A1 credit ratings and possibly lower them. 
Throughout the final quarter of 2009, officials in Athens
reviewed the budget and set goals for reducing the country’s
shortfall. Afinalized budget submitted in November sought
to cut the deficit to 8.7 percent of GDP in 2010, a move
Prime Minister George Papandreou and his finance minis-
ter, George Papaconstantinou, hoped would signal their
commitment to reorganizing the country’s public finances.
But at the same time, forecasts about Greece’s debt-to-GDP
ratio, the relationship between a country’s total outstanding
debt and its annual GDP, concerned many. The govern-
ment’s own estimates placed that number at 121 percent in
2010, while EU forecasts saw debt to GDP rising to 124.9
percent that year. In December, the major credit-rating
firms — Fitch Ratings, Standard & Poor, and Moody’s —
each downgraded Greek debt. 
During the first quarter of 2010, Greece continued taking
steps to curb the looming crisis. The government’s policy
moves were not enough to allay investors’ fears, however, in
part because austerity measures — which included public-
sector pay cuts, higher excise taxes on cigarettes and alcohol,
and stricter retirement rules — prompted large-scale
protests that seemed to threaten the government’s capabili-
ty to enact serious change. On March 25, European leaders
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agreed to create a joint financial safety net with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would allow
Greece to receive coordinated bilateral loans financed 
jointly by both EMU member countries and the IMF. That
action would occur only if the situation deteriorated further
and was subject to several stipulations, such as Athens
exhausting its other borrowing options. Nevertheless, on
April 27, S&P downgraded Greek bonds to “junk” status,
indicating it saw Greek debt as increasingly risky. 
Fiscal troubles have not been limited to Greece. Two
other southern European countries — Portugal and Spain —
also have faced significant fiscal challenges. When Moody’s
put Greek credit ratings on review in October 2009, it
changed the outlook on Portuguese debt to negative. More
recently, in the second quarter of 2010, both Spain and
Portugal received downgrades, with further downgrades for
both countries and Ireland into the fall. (Ireland’s fiscal situ-
ation worsened sharply in November, the consequences of
which were still developing as this article went to press.)
Response and Outlook
The most ambitious move by the EU came in May, as
European officials agreed to a nearly $1 trillion rescue pack-
age of government-loan guarantees for the continent.
Leaders intended for the coordinated intervention in gov-
ernment bond markets to send a signal of the EU’s
commitment to fledgling financial public finances in
Greece, Portugal, and Spain. For Americans, the EU’s move
may sound startlingly similar to some of
the policies the United States enacted in
2008 during the financial crisis, albeit with
a few key differences. “There are certainly
parallels between the European rescue
package and the U.S. bailout,” said
Guillermo Calvo, an economist at
Columbia University and former chief
economist at the Inter-American
Development Bank. “But there are impor-
tant differences, as well, other than the
recipients. Conditions in Europe and the
United States are different — the dollar is
still the world reserve currency, for one.” 
The rescue package and other policy
moves may have reduced the threat of
another recession caused by European
financial turmoil, at least for the time
being, Calvo says. But that is not to say that
policymakers or investors are out of the
woods. “There are a lot of policies in play.
Their results are uncertain over the short
term, and definitely over the longer term,”
said Robert Carpenter, an economist with
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
and the University of Maryland, Baltimore
County. “In my opinion, the evidence sug-
gests that market participants view the risk
of Greek default as moderate to high.” 
Desmond Lachman, an economist with the American
Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank,
argues that the rescue package may help “kick the can for-
ward” but that significant changes will be required, and
those may be painful. “Greece must get its deficit down
from 14 percent of GDPto 3 percent to be sustainable. That
kind of fiscal adjustment could bring about deep recession,
so it’s a kind of trap that makes it very difficult.”
That scenario could cause problems for Greece’s neigh-
bors. Greek debt sits on the balance sheets of France,
Germany, and other Western European countries, Lachman
says. The concern is not entirely about Greece, though. “The
Greek economy is relatively small,” says Calvo. “The fear is
that if Greece goes, then Spain will be the next to fall.” That
could cause other eurozone countries, such as Germany, to
waiver and refuse to make additional loans, Calvo argues.
According to the IMF, as of 2009 Spain was the world’s
ninth-largest economy by nominal GDP, while Greece was
number 28. The Spanish economy has been anything but
robust during the economic downturn, with unemployment
at roughly 20 percent.
Default is not inevitable, but the road to fiscal health and
stability in Europe is a complex one to navigate. Austerity
measures are one piece of the puzzle, but implementing
them has proven difficult. Public-sector employees have
protested in Greece, at times violently, and austerity meas-
ures only passed in Spain by a single vote. If such efforts
become too politically contested in either
country, there is a chance fiscal recovery
efforts will be hampered significantly. 
The rescue package is perhaps the most
important policy move thus far in deter-
mining the trajectory of the crisis.
Although the move seems to have quelled
some distress, it remains an imperfect solu-
tion. “While crises may be contained
through the injection of liquidity in the
short run,” Carpenter says, “the potential
for moral hazard is made worse through
bailouts, and now these bailouts involve
sovereign states, who can pass the cost of
their decisions to residents of other coun-
tries.” Carpenter emphasizes that a bailout
buys time, but that unless Greece adopts a
more sustainable fiscal path, it may face
future crises regardless. 
The entire effect of the “Aegean conta-
gion” on the United States remains to be
seen. U.S. banks are not completely insulat-
ed from the situation in Europe, but the
degree of the exposure is difficult to deter-
mine. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke told members of the Joint
Economic Committee that “exposures of
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Co-operation and Developmentholdings to European governments is relatively limited.” But
some market participants are less sanguine. Banking analyst
Richard Bove speculated in a research report that “big
American banks have a bigger stake in this drama than
thought.” He estimated that J.P. Morgan Chase, the United
States’ second largest bank by consolidated assets, has $1.4
trillion of exposure across Europe, while the next largest,
Citigroup, Inc, has $468.4 billion.
Although economists and investors disagree about the
precise amount of American-bank exposure to Europe,
there is little dispute that a systemic crisis in the EMU
would be felt sharply across the Atlantic. “AEuropean melt-
down would be very bad for the United States,” Lachman
says. “There is not high exposure to peripheral sovereign
debt, but a major European problem would cause U.S. banks
to feel the effects. A declining euro also would hurt U.S.
exports to Europe and could cause risk aversion in American
markets.” 
The European Monetary Union: Past and Future
Although any country that maintains a high debt-to-GDP
ratio risks financial turmoil, the common currency experi-
ment in Europe makes the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish
situations particularly distinctive and unpredictable. One
key limitation of being in the euro zone is that, for better or
for worse, these countries cannot devalue currency to make
debt repayment less painful.
The origins of monetary union in Europe date back to
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established provisions for
a single currency, and the euro became legal, albeit at first
nonphysical, tender for 14 European Union countries on 
Jan. 1, 1999. Six more countries, including Greece, would
adopt the euro during the 2000s. The most notable non-
member is the United Kingdom, which still uses the British
pound. For the other EU member states, the reasons for
monetary union seemed compelling. “It would end forever
the exchange-rate volatility that had bedeviled the conti-
nent since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of
fixed rates in the 1970s,” writes economist Niall Ferguson of
Harvard University in an opinion article for the Financial
Times. He also points out that proponents of the euro
hoped it would end costly currency conversions and lead to
greater price transparency that would improve intra-conti-
nental trade. But as Calvo, Ferguson, and Lachman each
note, the geopolitical reasons were probably just as, if not
more, convincing for member states. Centralized monetary
control in theory would promote peaceful interdependence
among European states, and it would create a currency 
powerful enough to challenge the U.S. dollar for world-
reserve status.
For all the benefits of monetary union, however, the
details still proved challenging. The biggest concern for
most economists, it would appear, was the divorcing of 
monetary and fiscal policies — although the EMU estab-
lished a single currency and thus a single monetary policy,
there would be significantly less coordination in terms of
member-state spending. Although convergence criteria were
put into place and eventually codified with the Stability and
Growth Pact, how such rules would be enforced remained
unclear. 
The sovereign debt crisis may provide the necessary
spark for EMU members to discuss fiscal coordination poli-
cies in earnest, but any attempts to centralize authority
likely will be met with resistance. “It will be difficult to
achieve currency stability without fiscal harmonization,”
says Calvo. “They have been talking about doing this from
the beginning, but I don’t know how they are going to make
it happen.” Ferguson touched on a similar note. “What the
Greek crisis has belatedly revealed is that such fiscal central-
ization is the necessary corollary of a monetary union,” he
writes, arguing that the choices before the EMU are much
more fundamental than simply whether to bail out countries
facing significant fiscal problems.
But if ever there was an opportunity to pursue fiscal coor-
dination, now may be the time. “That’s one of the benefits
of these crises sometimes,” Calvo says. “Things will be
volatile for some time, but this crisis could spark the right
policies in the end.” Making such decisions politically possi-
ble is the crux of Europe’s long-term recovery, but so far that
has proven to be an elusive goal.  RF
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